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RECENT CASES
a deferred classification because of physical disability or dependents is en-
listed in one of the reserve corps of the Army or Navy, with four exceptions.
Those four, while not yet classified under the Selective Service as physically
disabled, have all been rejected for that reason in repeated attempts to join
the armed forces in some capacity.
Professor Talbot Smith continues on leave, serving as chief counsel
of the Civil Litigation Division of the Office of Price Administration. His
courses are being taught by Professor William Pittman, on leave from the
University of Kentucky. Professor Eckhardt has been commissioned an
officer in the Army Air Corps and his course in Landlord and Tenant in
the summer quarter was given by Paul Peterson, Esq., of the Columbia
bar. The property courses this year will be taught by Professor Wayne
Bettner.
Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-OCCUPATION OF THE FIELD BY ACT
OF CONGRESS SO AS TO PRECLUDE ACTION BY THE STATE
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson
The issue before the Court in this case was whether federal regulation of the
manufacturing of renovated butter, under the provisions of the Federal Renovated
Butter Act, precluded state condemnation of packing stock butter, an ingredient
of renovated butter, after it had been acquired in interstate commerce for manu-
facturing purposes, if the finished product were designed to be sold in interstate
commerce.
2
The defendant officials of the state of Alabama seized at plaintiff's factory
quantities of packing stock butter purchased in interstate commerce for manu-
facturing purposes and seized other quantities in transit to the factory in interstate
commerce, alleging that this material was impure and unfit for human consumption.
The Supreme Court of the United States held that once the packing stock butter
had been acquired by the manufacturer it was subject to the regulations of the
Federal Renovated Butter Act and could not be condemned by the state authori-
ties.3 The state could condemn the completed product, renovated butter, when
it was designed for sale in its jurisdiction; but an express provision of the federal
act reserved this power to the states.4
1. 62 Sup. Ct. 491 (U. S. 1942).
2. Id. at 493-4.
3. Id. at 502-3.
4. Id. at 498-9.
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The instant case involves an application of the so-called problem of "occu-
patiorr of the field." In the course of our constitutional history it has become well
settled that over matters of national concern, those requiring uniformity of treat-
ment throughout the nation as a whole, the federal government exercises an exclu-
sive power.5 Where a subject is primarily of local concern, state action is permitted
unless it is in conflict with the will of Congress as expressed by some affirmative
action.6 If a federal law pertaining to a given subject is construed by the courts
to have occupied the whole field, state regulation of the particular subject is pre-
cluded. There is no especial difficulty where there is such a direct conflict that
enforcement of the state statute prevents the execution of the federal law. But
the fighting ground is in the cases where execution of the state law does not
interfere with the enforcement of the act of Congress.
In the Cloverleaf Butter Company case there is no sound basis for finding the
state action unconstitutional because of interference with the execution of the fed-
eral regulations. Indeed Chief Justice Stone in his dissent shows clearly how the
state regulation actually aids in prevention of the sale of unwholesome renovated
butter. Although the Secretary of Agriculture had the power to inspect packing
stock butter, he lacked the power to condemn it, but had to wait and condemn
the finished product The presence of an impure ingredient in renovated butter
can often be detected only by delicate chemical tests.7 Hence seizure of the harmful
ingredient by the state makes it more likely that an impure product will not be
sold to the public.
The Court seems to emphasize that Congress in passing the Renovated Butter
Act intended to assume complete authority in the regulation of the manufacture
of renovated butter for interstate commerce. The court pointed out that the
manufacturing process was subjected to the continuous supervision of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture." The Act included numerous detailed regulations of the
industry, such as the requirement of the keeping of records, and provision for in-
spection and condemnation of the finished product In addition there were various
other sanitary provisions.9
Chief Justice Stone in his dissent says that state seizure of packing stock
butter was not prevented by the judicial and administrative construction of the
federal Pure Food and Drug Act, which authorized its confiscation. Hence he be-
lieves that state action should not be precluded in the instant case, where the
Secretary of Agriculture is given power only to inspect the packing stock butter.1 0
However, the detailed regulation of the entire industry is construed by the Court
5. Bowman v. Chicago and Northwestern Ry., 125 U. S. 465 (1887); Leis
v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890).
6. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia, 12 Howard
299 (1851).
7. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v Patterson, 62 Sup. Ct. 491 at 504 (U. S. 1942).
8. Id. at 502.
9. Id. at 497-8.
10. Id. at 505.
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as indicative of the purpose of Congress to occupy the entire field. The fact that
as to one phase of the program there is less regulation does not change its general
nature and effect
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent pointed out that the Department of Agri-
culture drafted the provisions of the Act. If the department had wished to with-
draw from the states their power to condemn impure packing stock butter it could
easily have done so by including an appropriate provision in the draft submitted
to Congress."' The majority opinion failed to consider this in arriving at the
intent of Congress, failing here to consider more than appeared on the face of the
act itself.
However, the majority opinion does suggest a plausible explanation of the
result of the case. The Court points out that the manufacture and distribution in
interstate and foreign commerce of renovated butter is an industry of substantial
importance. Because of the multi-state nature of the business it cannot be ef-
fectively regulated by isolated and competing states.' 2 The very close relationship
of the industry to interstate commerce is illustrated by the business of the partic-
ular plaintiff. The Cloverleaf Butter Company obtains seventy-five per cent of
its supply of packing stock butter from other states than Alabama and it ships
interstate ninety per cent of its finished product.'3 Considering these indications
of the close relationship bf the industry to interstate commerce, it is not surprising
to find the Court declaring that the Congressional regulation of the industry pre-
cluded state condemnation of packing stock butter acquired for use in the manu-
facturing process.
Here there is a broad general act of Congress regulating a subject, but there
has beeh a failure to provide for the particular point covered by the state legis-
lation-condemnation of the packing stock butter used in the manufacturing process.
An important consideration in such cases is that of the subject matter.'" If the
subject matter,as a whole is of considerable national interest and importance the
Court is more likely to find that the federal government has occupied the field,
as is well illustrated in the following typical situations.
The Alien Registration Act of Pennsylvania required aliens to carry and
produce on demand alien identification cards. The Federal Alien Registration Act
of 1940 did not include such provisions. Yet the Supreme Court held that state
legislation complementing the federal regulation was unconstitutional, stating that
it was imperative that the supremacy of the national government be maintained
in the general field of foreign affairs.' 5 Since the Constitution does vest the national
government with exclusive control over our international relations, it is to be
expected that the Supreme Court would so construe the law as to give exclusive
11. Id. at 507.
12. Id. at 502.
13. Id. at 493.
14. Note (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532.
15. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52 (1941).
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power over alien registration to the federal government, thus strengthening the
position of the latter in its relations with the governments of other nations.
The railway system as a whole bears a peculiar and close relationship to inter-
state commerce. 16 The Court was undoubtedly influenced by this fact in its
consideration of legislation relating to the liability of interstate railway carriers
for the death or injury of their employees while engaged in interstate commerce.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 provided for recovery only when
the injury had resulted wholly or partly from negligence of the railroad. The
Supreme Court held that the federal government had so completely occupied the
field as to prevent a state from providing for recovery where the death or injury
occurred without fault on the part of the carrier.17
The Supreme Court has generally upheld state legislation supplementary to
provisions of the Federal Pure Food and Drug Act.' 8 Necessities as to sanitary
or health measures may vary from one jurisdiction to another. Hence such public
health measures as pure food regulation are of considerable local concern.
The Cloverleaf Bi¢tter Company case may appear prima facie to be a reversal
of the preceding cases relating to pure food regulation. The Renovated Butter Act
involves pure food regulation as did the Federal Pure Food and Drug Act. How-
ever, it would be a mistake to assume that this case reverses all the previous law
on thig matter. The Court here emphasizes the interstate character of the par-
ticular industry concerned and the necessity for control of the industry by the
federal government if it is to be effectively regulated. 1
The test of considering the type of subject matter being regulated is very
satisfactory in determining whether there is occupation of the field where there
is a broad general act of Congress regulating a subject which fails to provide for
the particular point covered by the state legislation, as here. But there are cases
involving other types of federal statutes, which cannot be disposed of in this
manner.20 These cases may appear prima facie to be inconsistent with the previous
16. A large share of the business of railroads is concerned with interstate
commerce. Also the national government has from the beginning of the history
of the railroad system in this nation actively participated in the encouragement
of its development, and in later times has attempted through regulation of the
railways.
17. New York Central R. R. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 (1917).
18. Although the Federal Pure Food and Drugs Act prohibited misbranding,
it did not require publication of ingredients. A local statute requiring such publi-
cation was upheld, there being no actual conflict with the federal act. Savage v.
Jones, 225 U. S. 501 (1912). A statute prohibiting the shipment out of the state
of green or immature citrus fruit unfit for human consumption was upheld, since
the provisions of the Federal Food and Drugs Act relating to shipments in inter-
state commerce applied only to fruit in a filthy, decomposed, or putrid condition.
Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 (1915). Also upheld was a statute of North
Dakota regulating the net weight of lard, the court explaining that the Federal
Pure Food and Drugs Act was not directed toward the manner of selling the
commodity at retail. Armour and Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510 (1916).
19. Cloverleaf , Butter Co. v. Patterson, 62 Sup. Ct. 491 at 502 (1942).
20. Note (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 532.
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discussion. However, they involve considerations and the application of rules of in-
terpretation not discussed here.21 One should note these to avoid possible mis-
application of the preceding analysis.
WILWAM E. AULGUR
21. There has arisen the question of what is the result where an administra-
tive agency or governmental official is granted authority to make rules and regu-
lations appertaining to a given subject but has not yet exercised the authority.
The Court has refused to find supersedure here where the delegation of authority
relied on is a broad regulatory power over the industry as a whole. The Interstate
Commerce Act gave the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to regulate
interstate carriers. Yet the Supreme Court held that the delegation of broad powers
over commerce to the Interstate Commerce Commission did not disturb the au-
thority of the state in the absence of some affirmative action by the Commission
in the exercise of its powers. (Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Larabee Flour Mills Co.,
211 U. S. 612 (1909)). Where occupation of the field has been found to exist
there has been an express delegation of authority to make regulations pertaining
to the phase of the industry regulated by the state enactment In Missouri Pac.
R. R, v. Porter it was held that state authority to establish requirements as to
the form of bills of lading had been superseded by federal legislation. In that case
the Interstate Commerce Commission had been expressly granted the power to
prescribe the form of bills of lading. (Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Porter, 273 U. S.
341 (1927)) where it was held that a state could not require certain types of
equipment for locomotives the Interstate Commerce Commission had been given
the authority to regulate locomotive equipment. (Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line
R. R., 272 U. S. 605 (1926)). Likewise in the case of Oregon-Washington Naviga-
tion Co. v. Washington, where the Supreme Court found that authorization of the
Secretary of Agriculture to quarantine interstate shipments of products infected
with plant diseases precluded state prohibition of the introduction of such commodi-
ties, the Secretary of Agriculture could have enforced the same quarantine that
was imposed by the state. (Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341 (1927)).
In these cases the administrative agency or governmental official is given authority
to prescribe regulations in connection with a specific subject matter. It is left
to the discretion of the agency or official to determine whether regulations will
actually be prescribed. The rules and regulations are not set out in the act but
are made by the agency or official. In the cases where supersedure has been
found it was possible for the official or agency to formulate the same type of regu-
lation as was enacted by the state. Thus in the Porter case the Interstate Com-
merce Commission could have prescribed the form of bills of lading and could
have adopted the identical provision set out in the state statute if that had seemed
desirable.
Whether in a given instance where a federal official or agency is authorized
to regulate the particular phase of an industry regulated by the state supersedure
is found' will depend largely on the type of subject matter involved. Where the
industry regulated bears an unusually close relationship to interstate commerce
supersedure is more likely to be found than where it does not. In the Porter and
Napier cases, where it was held that occupation of the field had resulted, the regu-
lations imposed related to railway transportation, which is peculiarly related to
interstate commerce. In Welch v. New Hampshire the Supreme Court held that
Congress had not occupied the field by authorizing the Interstate Commerce Com-
missiorn to prescribe maximum hours of service for employees of interstate motor
carriers. However, the Court emphasized the fact that the roads belonged to the
state. Since the state had constructed and maintained its own highways, it was
only reasonable that it should be permitted to impose regulations pertaining.to the
use of the same. Also the Court was strongly influenced by the element of safety.
It was essential that motor traffic be regulated by some authority, and since the
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5
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1942
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ToRTs-A'tAcTrvE NUISANC E DOCTRINE
State ex rel. V. E. Callahan Construction Company v. Hughes'
The action was brought and tried on the' theory that certain cooper's buckets,
owned and maintained as equipment in operating defendant's rock quarry, and
one of which caused the death of plaintiffs' son, constituted an attractive nuisance.
The bucket, made of iron or steel, was about three and one-half to four feet tall,
and about four feet in diameter. The handle when upright was about five feet
higher than the bucket. There was a ring on the handle, the purpose of which was
to hold the handle upright by being fastened over an upright piece of steel at the
top of the bucket. When in use the cooper's buckets were swung on a crane to which
the handles were attached. They were generally in use when the quarry was in op-
eration, but were not all in use at the same time. There were seven of the buckets in
the quarry at the time of the accident, though the quarry was not in operation. The
handles of two were in an upright position (the other five having been lowered to
the ground), but only one of these was properly fastened by the ring. The handle
of the bucket about which plaintiffs' son was playing when he was killed was in
an upright position, but the ring was not fastened over the upright metal piece so
as to prevent it from falling. The result was that when the boy jumped from the
bucket, the handle fell, striking him across the back of the neck and killing him
Interstate Commerce Commission had not acted state action was the only remain-
ing possibility. (Welch v. New Hampshire, 306 U. S. 79 (1939)).
A somewhat related problem is that of the legal consequences when the ef-
fective date of a federal statute is postponed. The Federal Hours of Service Act
of 1907, providing for maximum hours for employees of interstate carriers, did not
go into effect until one year subsequent to passage of the act. It was held that
state laws fixing maximum hours of employees of interstate carriers were super-
seded during the interval. However, the Court found that Congress intended to
postpone the enforcement of the regulations so as to give the railroads sufficient
time in which to adjust their systems to the changed conditions under the act.
(Erie R. R. v. New York, 233 U. S. 671 (1914)). It is possible that in a different
situation where there was no such purpose in postponement the Court might reach
an opposite result.
In cases where certain phases of a given subject have been regulated by a
number of federal enactments, but the particular phase included in the state regu-
lation has not been touched on by the federal legislation, the Supreme Court has
found no supersedure of state authority. Thus the Locomotive Headlight Law
of Georgia was found to be constitutional, though Congress had passed safety
appliance acts relating to almost all other types of locomotive equipment. (Atlantic
Coast Line R. R. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280 (1914)). In the case of Kelly v. Wash-
ington a local statute providing for the inspection of hulls and machinery of motor
driven tugs was found to be valid. By the Federal Motor Boat Regulations Act
and a number of other enactments relating to the safety of vessels the field was
already extensively regulated, though none of the measures made any provision
as to the specific subject matter. In addition to the type of federal regulation
involved the Court was influenced by the element of safety. There was great
danger of loss of life and property unless precautionary steps were taken. (Kelly
v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. 1 (1937)).
1. 348 Mo. 1209, 159 S. W. (2d) 251 (1941).
[Vol. 7
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instantly. The quarry was located in the southwest part of St. Louis, near numerous
dwelling houses. Prior to the accident, defendant had been operating the quarry
for three or four months, during which time children had habitually, almost daily,
resorted to the quarry and played around the cooper's buckets, with the knowledge
of the defendant's employees working in the quarry. No warning was ever given
to the children, except while blasting was in progress. The quarry was not fenced,
or otherwise enclosed, and there were no signs posted to warn children to keep away
from the quarry or buckets. The court, in denying recovery, said that the single
act of leaving the offending handle standing with the ring unattached, was no
more than "mere casual negligence," and not evidence sufficient to establish that
defendant maintained an attractive nuisance.
It has been generally recognized that the law imposes no duty upon the owner
of land towards those who come there solely for their own convenience or pleasure,
and who are not expressly invited or induced to come there by the purpose for
which the premises are appropriated and occupied, or by some preparation or adap-
tion of the place for use by customers or passengers which might naturally and
reasonably lead them to believe they may properly and safely enter.2 A major
exception to this general rule has been made under a fiction known as the attractive
nuisance doctrine,-whereby infant trespassers may under certain circumstances hold
the possessor legally responsible for injuries received while trespassing.
The doctrine, as set forth by the Restatement,3 (and cited by the Missouri
Supreme Court in Hull v. Gilioz),4 is that "a possessor of land is subject to liability
for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or
other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if (a) the place where
the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows or should
know that such children are likely to trespass, and (b) the condition is one of
which the possessor knows or should know and which he realizes or should realize
as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children,
and (c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize
the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made dangerous
by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight
as compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
Prior to 1939, the Missouri. Supreme Court had said in many cases that the
attractive nuisance doctrine in this state was limited to turntables.5 In that year
the court cast aside this limitation and applied the doctrine to a pile of I-beams
(Haul case), but did (by dicta) impose certain restrictions on the application of
2. Straub v. Soderer, 53 Mo. 38 (1873); Peters v. Bowman, 115 Cal. 345,
47 Pac. 113, 47 Pac. 598 (1897; Pastorello v. Stone, 89 Conn. 286, 93 AtL 529
(1915); Sweeny v. Old Coloney & N. R. R., 10 Allen 368 (Mass. 1865); Dobbins
v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 91 Tex. 60, 41 S. W. 62 (1897).
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 339.
4. 344 Mo. 1227, 130 S. W. (2d) 623 (1939), noted in (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv.
466 and (1940) 5 Mo.; L. Rzv. 476.
5. Howard v. St Joseph Transmission Co., 316 Mo. 317, 289 S. W. 597
(1926); Buddy v. Union Terminal Ry., 276 Mo. 276, 207 S. W. 821 (1918); State
1942]
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the doctrine.6 Since that case, the court has been pressed to determine the scope
of the doctrine now that expansion of the doctrine has been permitted.
In Emery v. Thompson,7 the facts were very similar to those of the Hull case,
except the instrumentality involved was a stack of railroad ties, instead of a pile
of I-beams. The court in that case held, however, that the ties were not in-
herently dangerous within the meaning of the attractive nuisance doctrine, since
the danger, if any, arising therefrom would be the negligent manner in which the
ties were piled, and therefore the danger would result from mere "casual or
collateral negligence" of others in piling the ties. In the instant case, the St. Louis
Court of Appeals8 (which the Supreme Court reversed) had said that there could
be no doubt that the cooper's bucket left with the handle upright and unlocked
was inherently dangerous. It was referred to as a "veritable deadfall, threatening
the life of any child that might be enticed to play upon or about it."
Since the court will be likely to conclude that the case is one of "casual or
collateral negligence" when it refuses to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine,
helpful considerations should be evolved so as to give a clear notion as to when
a set of facts falls under the attractive nuisance doctrine, for which liability will
be imposed, and when it will be labelled casual negligence. The court said in ther
Hull case that "Inherently dangerous means that danger inheres in the in-
strumentality or condition itself, at all times, so as to require special precautions
to'be taken with regard to it to prevent injury; instead of danger arising from mere
casual or collateral negligence of others with respect to it under particular circum-
stances." On motion for rehearing the court elaborated further on the same notion:
"However, we ruled that an object might be 'inherently dangerous' either because
of. danger inhering in the instrumentality itself, or inhering in the condition in
which it was" left, at all times during the existence of the instrumentality or the
condition which caused the injury. In other words, to make the doctrine applicable,
ex rel. Kansas City Light & Power Co. v. Trimble, 315 Mo. 32, 285 S. W. 459, 49
A. L. R. 1053 (1926); Kelly v. Beans, 217 Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 557 (1909). The one
seemingly inconsistent Supreme Court decision-Schmidt v. Kansas City Dis-
tilling Co., 90 Mo. 284, 1 S. W. 865 (1886) (pool formed by discharge of escape
pipe from -boiler)-was later overruled in Barney v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R., 126
Mo. 372, 28 S. W. 1069 (1895).
6. (1) The doctrine applies in Missouri only where the trespasses are due to
the attraction of a dangerous instrumentality or condition, rather than applying
to conditions and instrumentalities that the children could not see or know of
without first trespassing. (2) The doctrine is limited to conditions and instru-
mentalities which are inherently dangerous rather than those in which danger has
been created by mere casual negligence under particular circumstances, An in-
strumentality can be "inherently dangerous" either because of danger inhering in
the instrumentality itself, or because of danger inhering in the condition in which
it was left, at all times during the existence of the instrumentality or the condition
which caused the injury. (Query whether the latter is really a restriction at all
or whether it is not another way of trying to define the nature of an attractive
nuisance.)
7. 347 Mo. 494, 148 S. W. (2d) 479 (1941).
8. Street v. W. E. Callahan Const. Co., 147 S. W. (2d) 153 (Mo. App. 1941).
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where the condition, in which the instrumentality is left, is the cause of injury,
it must be a condition which is so dangerous at all times that, without the con-
currence of any casual or collateral negligence of third persons to increase the
danger at or near the time of the injury, it should reasonably be anticipated as
likely to cause injury to children playing there unless special precautions are
taken to prevent it." But the court also makes clear, in the opinion that casual
negligence is not a term applied to the conduct of third persons only.
Perhaps another way of expressing the same notion would be to compare
the magnitude of the recognizable risk to the children, with the utility or usefulness
to the possessor in maintaining the condition. The magnitude of the risk would
involve the probability of the injury which may be foreseen as flowing from the
danger together with the seriousness of the injury which may be anticipatid. In
considering the utility or usefulness to the possessor in maintaining the condition,
the burden to the possessor and the interference with the possessor's use of his land
or property which alleviation of the danger would entail, must be weighed. For
example, farming machinery involves inevitable danger to children meddling with
it, but its essential importance to agriculture permits it to be used if kept in proper
place and condition. If the installation of devices which would prevent the machine
being set in motion were practicable without burdensome cost or serious inter-
ference with the utility of the machine (as in the case of a turntable) it might be
unreasonable for a farmer to keep a machine without such equipment in a place
notoriously open to trespassing children. In the instant case, the magnitude of
the risk was, perhaps, not so great as a three thousand pound piece of steel in the
H1/ case falling upon a trespassing child even though the child in the instant case
suffered death whereas the child in the Hul case suffered injuries. On the other
hand, it could not have interfered seriously with the operation of the quarry to
make certain that the heavy handles were left in a safe position when the buckets
were not in use.
After weighing these factors the court may reasonably have concluded that
the case is one of casual negligence only and therefore, falls outside the attractive
nuisance doctrine. Perhaps of greater influence on the decision is that there was
room for doubt as to whether defenddnt even left the bucket without the ring
attached to the upright handle in the first place. The assumption is made that
it is entirely conceivable the ring was removed by a casual act of a trespasser or by
the children themselves. Of course, this in itself would take the doctrine out of
the case if the children were old enough to appreciate the danger.9
EUGENE M. SACKIN
9. RESTATEMENTr, TORTS (1934) § 339 (c). For an exhaustive survey of the
doctrine, see Notes (1925) 36 A. L. R. 34, supplemented in (1926) 45 A. L. R.
982 (1928), 53 A. L. R. 1344 (1929), 60 A. L. R. 1444; Note (1914) 2 U. OF Mo.
BULL. L. SEn. 41; Note (1938) 36 MicH. L. Rsv. 1024; Note (1939) 4 Mo. L. REv.
466; Note (1940) 5 Mo. L. REv. 476. On the earlier Missouri cases, see Clark,
Tort Liability for Negligence in Missouri (1915) 7 U. OF Mo. BULL. L. SER. 3, 14.
19421
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